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Eighty years since its inception, the Montana Law Review remains
committed to publishing on “matters of Montana law or matters of especial
interest to Montana lawyers.”1 Beginning with its initial publication in the
spring of 1940, this journal has striven to provide its readers with, among
other things, “criticisms of recent decisions.”2 The precise form this goal
has taken has varied across the years. Most recently, a discussion of recent
decisions could be found in Recent Decisions Affecting the Montana Practi-
tioner published routinely from 2004 to 2013. Now, the Montana Law Re-
view is pleased to introduce Significant Montana Cases, a series of pieces
analyzing several recent decisions from the Montana Supreme Court.
In publishing Significant Montana Cases, the Montana Law Review
seeks to reintroduce into each volume a discussion of cases likely to affect
the ordinary attorney practicing law in the Treasure State. The cases se-
lected for publication have been deemed “significant” because they involve
the advancement of Montana law in a manner likely to affect a wide range
of practitioners across the state. Such a determination stands in contrast to
decisions that are well known for reasons unrelated to practical importance,
such as surrounding media attention or a litigant’s notoriety.
The editorial board of the Montana Law Review would like to express
its appreciation for the students who established this journal eighty years
ago along with the students, then and now, who have spent countless hours
preparing each issue for publication. Most of all, the Montana Law Review
would like to thank its readers for their continued support. We hope that
you enjoy the following case summaries, along with the rest of the issue,
1. Establishment of the Montana Law Review, 1 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1940).
2. Id.
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and we look forward to continuing to fulfill our role as the only law review
dedicated exclusively to Montana legal issues.
II. CROSS V. WARREN 3
In Cross v. Warren, the Montana Supreme Court held that: (1) plain-
tiffs cannot “stack” third-party liability coverage for vehicles covered under
the same insurance policy; and (2) the third-party liability coverage at issue
was not illusory.4
On January 8, 2015, eighteen-year-old Taylor Warren (“Warren”) in-
jured Kenneth Cross, Henley Brady, and Roland Redfield in an accident he
caused while driving a vehicle owned by his parents.5 At the time of the
accident, both Warren and the vehicle were insured under a Progressive
Direct Insurance Company (“Progressive”) motor vehicle insurance policy
covering all four members of the Warren family.6 The policy included sepa-
rate liability coverages for each of the family’s four vehicles, including
identical bodily injury liability coverage limits of $100,000 for each per-
son.7
Following the accident, Progressive paid $100,000 in liability cover-
age to each of the three plaintiffs injured in the accident for a total
$300,000.8 The plaintiffs, however, claimed they were entitled to recover
$400,000 per person based on the combined, or stacked, liability coverage
for all four of the Warrens’ vehicles insured under the policy.9 Progressive
refused to stack the four liability coverages, asserting the plaintiffs already
received the maximum amount of the liability coverage available under the
policy.10 Litigation on the issue ensued.
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, noting
the Montana Supreme Court had not ruled third-party liability coverages
were stackable, and federal courts applying Montana law had denied stack-
ing in previous rulings.11
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued Montana Code Annotated
§ 33–23–203, as amended in 2007, allowed stacking of all automobile in-
surance coverage, including liability coverage, and a Montana court must
apply the controlling Montana statute.12 Progressive argued the statute was
3. 435 P.3d 1202 (Mont. 2019).
4. Id.






11. Id. at 1204–05.
12. Id. at 1205.
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 81 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/7
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-1\MON107.txt unknown Seq: 3 31-MAR-20 9:46
2020 SIGNIFICANT MONTANA CASES 165
always anti-stacking and remained so after the amendment.13 Additionally,
Progressive argued prior precedent never permitted “stacking for non-in-
sureds seeking benefits under a policy they did not purchase,” so “the only
reasonable explanation is the Legislature intended to continue prohibiting
stacking” and provided insurers “a way to prevent stacking that Montana
common law would otherwise require.”14
The Court began its analysis with the statute’s initial clause, which
reads “[u]nless a motor vehicle liability policy specifically provides other-
wise, the limits of insurance coverage available under each part of the pol-
icy must be determined as follows . . . .”15 Given this language, the Court
considered whether this statute or the relevant policy determines the cover-
age limits when the two conflict.16
The plaintiffs argued that, based on the Court’s decision in Christensen
v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company,17 the statute
only defers to conflicting provisions included in policies when such provi-
sions permit stacking, not policy provisions that prohibit it.18 However, the
Court decided Christensen before the statute’s revision in 2007.19 Here, the
Court concluded “the initial clause of the statute now defers to insurance
policies that provide alternate coverage stacking determinations to those
provided by the statute.”20 The Court further noted the declarations page of
the Warrens’ insurance policy specifically and unambiguously provided
that stacking of coverages would not be permitted.21
Next, the plaintiffs challenged the enforceability of the anti-stacking
provisions of the insurance policy on public policy grounds, asserting there
was no difference between first-party coverages, such as uninsured motor-
ist, underinsured motorist, or medical payment coverages, and third-party
coverages.22 The Court has permitted stacking of first-party coverages that
are “personal and portable,” including uninsured motorist, underinsured
motorist, and medical payment coverages.23 Coverage is “personal and
portable” when it “is applicable without regard to the ownership or use of a
motor vehicle.”24
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1205–06.
15. Id. at 1206–07 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 33–23–203(1)).
16. Id. at 1207.
17. 22 P.3d 624 (Mont. 2000).
18. Cross, 435 P.3d at 1207.
19. Id.
20. Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 33–23–203(1)(c)).
21. Id. at 1207–08.
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Here, the Court noted liability insurance is not portable or applicable
in all circumstances; instead, as provided in Progressive’s policy, liability
insurance applies only to an accident arising from the ownership, mainte-
nance, or use of an automobile or trailer.25 The Court explained Progres-
sive’s policy would not follow the insured in other scenarios; for example,
if Taylor Warren had injured the plaintiffs in a negligent act unrelated to the
ownership, maintenance, or use of a vehicle.26 Even so, the Court noted
there is limited portability with liability coverage to the extent it follows
insureds when they drive a car owned by another party who is not insured
under the same policy.27
Still, the Court stressed coverage is triggered by and dependent on the
use and involvement of a motor vehicle.28 As liability coverage is vehicle
dependent, the coverage is triggered solely because a vehicle is involved in
the accident.29 Therefore, the Court reasoned, “each additional insured ve-
hicle presents a separate and additional risk: that by using it, another driver
could cause an additional liability-incurring accident.”30 While an individ-
ual could not drive multiple motor vehicles at once, it is possible for multi-
ple vehicles driven by permissive drivers to be involved in different liabil-
ity-creating accidents at the same time, with each vehicle’s use triggering
liability coverage for damages incurred in each separate accident pursuant
to the premium paid for that vehicle.31 Against this backdrop, the Court
held that because Progressive paid the full amount of liability coverage for
the vehicle involved in the accident and continued to assume the risk of
paying claims for the Warrens’ other vehicles, the separate premiums paid
on the other vehicles secured protection for the Warrens and was not illu-
sory.32
The Court also held it was unreasonable to expect Progressive to pay
more than the coverage limit for the vehicle involved in the accident be-
cause: (1) liability coverage is tied to a particular vehicle’s use and is not
personal and portable; (2) the policy did not contain illusory coverage; and
(3) the policy unambiguously and repeatedly stated coverages on separate
vehicles could not be stacked.33
Additionally, the Court noted the plaintiffs were strangers to the insur-
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ing them would carry liability insurance in the amount required by Montana
law—$25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident34—and the Warrens had
more than the required minimum insurance.35 In the end, the Court held the
anti-stacking provisions of Progressive’s policy, as applied to liability cov-
erage, did not violate public policy and the district court did not err in grant-
ing Progressive summary judgment on the issue of whether it was required
to stack liability coverage under the policy.36
In a concurring opinion, Justice Laurie McKinnon emphasized her fo-
cus on the distinction between optional first-party coverage, which is per-
sonal and portable and meant to protect the insured personally, and legally
mandated third-party coverage, where the claimant is not a named insured
and therefore can never have a reasonable expectation of the right to stack
coverage limits.37
In his dissent, Justice Dirk Sandefur, joined by Justice Ingrid Gustaf-
son, disagreed that the four policies were not stackable and said the Court’s
holding “oddly and illogically” allowed insurers to preclude stacking
outside of the statute enacted in response to the Court’s decision invalidat-
ing such preclusion unless clearly provided by the Legislature.38 The dis-
sent further argued that third-party liability coverage is no less personal and
portable than first-party coverage because mandatory liability insurance
goes with the insured driver no matter what vehicle they are driving.39 Ad-
ditionally, Justice Sandefur reasoned that, regardless of whether third-party
claimants are parties to the insurance contract, the important purpose of
third-party liability coverages is to protect the public from injuries caused
by the tortious conduct of others.40 Consequently, the dissent argued anti-
stacking provisions for third-party liability coverages is against public pol-
icy.41
Montana practitioners should be aware of the Court’s determination
that automobile insurance policy provisions prohibiting the stacking of
third-party liability coverage are legal under Montana law. The Court’s
holding in Cross likewise provides additional guidance on what types of
coverages it will determine to be “personal and portable,” and, therefore,
stackable under Montana law in future cases.
—Kelsey Dayton
34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61–6–103(1)(b)(i)–(ii).
35. Cross, 435 P.3d at 1209.
36. Id. at 1209–10.
37. Id. at 1211–12 (McKinnon, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 1212 (Sandefur & Gustafson, JJ., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1214.
40. Id. at 1215.
41. Id.
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III. STATE V. KURTZ 42
In State v. Kurtz, the Montana Supreme Court held a 422-day delay
between a defendant’s arrest for driving under the influence and his guilty
plea was sufficient to trigger the four-part balancing test for a speedy trial
violation, and, upon analysis under the test, the delay violated the defen-
dant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.43
On May 3, 2015, a Montana Highway Patrol trooper arrested David
Kurtz in Yellowstone County for driving with a suspended license and op-
erating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.44 Kurtz
pleaded not guilty but was unable to post the $20,000 bond set by the dis-
trict court.45 The district court scheduled a trial for August 17, 2015, and on
July 22, 2015, Kurtz filed a motion to suppress challenging the traffic stop’s
legality.46 A week later, the State moved to postpone the trial because it had
not received toxicology results from the crime lab.47 Kurtz agreed to post-
poning the trial until the toxicology results could be obtained.48 On August
31, 2015, the district court held a hearing on Kurtz’s motion to suppress,
which it subsequently denied in November.49 On December 14, 2015, the
district court reset the trial date for January 4, 2016.50 Four days after the
district court set the new trial date, Kurtz’s counsel requested the district
court “not call a jury for January 4, 2016,” and the judicial assistant said if
there was not going to be a trial, Kurtz needed to “file a motion to continue
with a waiver.”51
On December 21, 2015, Kurtz filed a status report and requested the
district court vacate the January trial and set a change of plea hearing.52 No
hearing was set, and the January trial date passed.53 On April 12, 2016, the
State requested the district court reset the trial, and the district court set a
new trial date for May 23, 2016.54 On May 11, 2016, Kurtz filed a motion
to dismiss on the basis that his right to a speedy trial had been violated.55
The May trial date passed, and the district court held a hearing on Kurtz’s
motion to dismiss on June 1, 2016, ultimately denying it three weeks later.
42. 443 P.3d 479 (Mont. 2019).
43. Id. at 488.
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The district court explained that the length and reasons for the delay
weighed in favor of finding a speedy trial violation, but Kurtz’s response to
the delay and the prejudice the delay caused his defense mitigated any
prejudice he sustained.56 Consequently, the district court found no constitu-
tional speedy trial violation.57
Kurtz entered a change of plea with the district court four days later
and pleaded guilty to felony driving under the influence of alcohol. The
district court sentenced him to the maximum 13-month sentence with the
Department of Corrections, followed by a five-year suspended sentence.58
Because Kurtz’s pretrial incarceration was 26 days longer than his sentence,
he was immediately released and awarded a $2,470 credit toward his $5,000
fine.59 Kurtz appealed the ruling claiming he was denied his right to a
speedy trial.60
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II,
section 24 of the Montana Constitution both guarantee criminal defendants
a right to a speedy trial.61 When the delay between an accusation and trial
exceeds two hundred days, the Court uses a four-factor balancing test devel-
oped in State v. Ariegwe62 to determine if the defendant was denied a
speedy trial.63 The test balances: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason
for the delay; (3) the accused’s response to the delay; and (4) the prejudice
to the accused.64 No factor is dispositive; instead, the factors must be con-
sidered together with all other relevant circumstances.65
In looking at the first factor, the length of the delay, the Court found
the 422 days between Kurtz’s arrest and plea intensified the presumption of
prejudice and increased the State’s burden to justify the delay.66
Under the second factor, the reasons for the delay, Kurtz challenged
the 64-day delay between the September trial date and the district court’s
denial of his suppression motion, and the 99-day delay between the January
1, 2016, trial date and the date the State asked to reset the trial.67 “Delay is
charged to the State unless the accused caused the delay or affirmatively





60. Id. at 481–82.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24.
62. 167 P.3d 815 (Mont. 2007).
63. Kurtz, 443 P.3d at 482–83.
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Regarding the 64-day delay, the State argued Kurtz’s failure to follow
up after the judge revealed a potential conflict and told Kurtz’s attorney to
advise the court if it was an issue delayed the district court’s ruling.69 Kurtz
argued the delay was due entirely to the State’s lack of diligence, and be-
cause he had no issue with the potential conflict, he correctly followed the
court’s instructions to only follow up if there was a problem.70 The Court
determined Kurtz reasonably assumed the trial would proceed if he ex-
pressed no concern about the potential conflict.71 The Court rejected the
State’s alternate explanation that the delay was due to a training session
because the delay continued 22 days after the judge returned.72 In sum, the
Court attributed this delay to the State.73
Kurtz argued the 99-day delay was also the State’s fault because, after
he requested a change of plea hearing, the State had the burden to ensure a
hearing was set.74 In response, the State claimed the defendant bore some
responsibility for representing a plea deal had been reached without enter-
ing a plea.75 The Court held that once Kurtz filed his motion to vacate the
January trial and set a change of plea hearing, it was the State’s responsibil-
ity to schedule the hearing.76 Because Kurtz did not try to further delay the
process, and ongoing negotiations for deferred prosecution or a plea bargain
do not relieve the prosecution’s burden to bring the defendant to trial in a
timely fashion, the Court found the State responsible for the delay.77
The Court also found the third factor, the accused’s responses to the
delay, weighed in Kurtz’s favor.78 The State argued Kurtz failed to demon-
strate the desire for a speedy trial when he made no attempt to pursue a
change of plea hearing.79 Kurtz argued he was not required to repeatedly
ask for the case to proceed, as a defendant does not abandon his right to a
speedy trial by engaging in plea negotiations.80 The Court evaluated the
totality of the circumstances and found Kurtz affirmatively sought resolu-
tion of the case through a change of plea hearing, and it was the State’s
burden to move forward with either a trial or change of plea.81







76. Id. at 485.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 485–86.
79. Id. at 486.
80. Id. at 485–86.
81. Id. at 486.
8
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The Court evaluates the fourth factor, the prejudice to the accused, by
considering the interests a speedy trial is meant to protect: “(i) preventing
oppressive pretrial incarceration, (ii) minimizing anxiety and concern
caused by the presence of unresolved criminal charges, and (iii) limiting the
possibility that the accused’s ability to present an effective defense will be
impaired.”82
The Court explained Kurtz’s pre-trial incarceration exceeded the maxi-
mum sentence for his charged offense, a simple driving under the influence
offense, where the room for tolerable delay is relatively low.83 While incar-
cerated, Kurtz was denied both prescribed pain and mental health medica-
tion. After four months, Kurtz was given his mental health medication at a
significantly lower dose than prescribed, but was never allowed to resume
taking the prescribed pain medication.84 The Court found his lack of medi-
cal treatment, along with the fact he was incarcerated for longer than the
maximum sentence for the offense, supported the conclusion his incarcera-
tion was oppressive.85
The Court also found the delay prolonged the disruption of Kurtz’s life
and aggravated the anxiety inherent with being accused of a crime.86 While
the State argued Kurtz’s depression existed before his incarceration, Kurtz
testified his anxiety levels while incarcerated increased and his depression
worsened.87 Additionally, while incarcerated, Kurtz lost his home when he
was unable to pay rent.88 Kurtz did not claim the delay impaired his de-
fense, but, when evaluating all the interests, the Court found the fourth fac-
tor nonetheless weighed in Kurtz’s favor.89
Balancing the four factors, the Court held Kurtz’s constitutional right
to a speedy trial was violated, and the State did not provide a compelling
justification for the delay or show the delay did not prejudice the defen-
dant.90 The Court remanded the case for dismissal of the charges.91
Because there is no set length of time that per se violates an accused’s
right to a speedy trial, Montana practitioners should be aware of how the
Court uses the four-factor balancing test pronounced in Ariegwe. Addition-
ally, Montana practitioners should note how the Court weighs factors such
as the length of pretrial incarceration exceeding the maximum sentence as-
82. Id. (citing State v. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815, 848 (Mont. 2007)).
83. Id. at 486–87.
84. Id. at 487.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 487–88.
87. Id. at 487.
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sociated with the charge and the accused’s heightened anxiety and depriva-
tion of medication while incarcerated, as well as the State’s burden to show
a compelling interest and that the delay did not prejudice the defendant.
—Kelsey Dayton
IV. CITY OF KALISPELL V. SALSGIVER 92
In City of Kalispell v. Salsgiver, the Montana Supreme Court held that
a defendant charged with a serious offense did not waive his federal consti-
tutional right to a jury trial by failing to appear at his omnibus hearing.93
On March 18, 2015, Salsgiver pled not guilty to partner or family
member assault (“PFMA”) and was released on his own recognizance.94 As
a condition of his release, the municipal court ordered Salsgiver to person-
ally appear for all court proceedings and warned him that failing to do so
would result in waiver of a jury trial.95 The municipal court informed him
of his upcoming omnibus hearing scheduled for May 5, 2015, and Salsgiver
signed an acknowledgment of his conditions of release.96 When the munici-
pal court issued a notice of omnibus, it reiterated Salsgiver’s personal pres-
ence was required and his failing to appear would result in a waiver of a
jury trial.97 Nonetheless, Salsgiver failed to appear at the omnibus hearing,
although his defense counsel was present.98 Based on Salsgiver’s failure to
attend the omnibus hearing, the municipal court concluded he waived his
right to a jury, set a date for a bench trial, and issued a bench warrant for
Salsgiver’s arrest.99
Salsgiver was arrested on October 15, 2015, before being arraigned
and released on his own recognizance the next day.100 The municipal court
informed Salsgiver his bench trial would take place November 12, 2015.101
On October 28, 2015, Salsgiver’s counsel filed a motion for a jury trial,
which the court denied on November 10, 2018.102 At his bench trial, Sal-
sgiver’s counsel again objected to the assertion that Salsgiver had waived
his right to a jury trial, but the bench trial proceeded.103 Salsgiver was
92. 443 P.3d 504 (Mont. 2019).
93. Id. at 513.









103. Id. at 508–09.
10
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found guilty of PFMA and criminal mischief and sentenced to 364 days of
incarceration, with 362 days suspended, and two days credit for his time
served.104 Salsgiver appealed the denial of his motion for a jury trial to the
district court, which affirmed the municipal court’s ruling.105 Salsgiver then
appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.106
The lower courts found Salsgiver’s failure to appear at his omnibus
hearing constituted a waiver of his right to a jury trial under Article II,
section 26 of the Montana Constitution and Salsgiver knowingly, intelli-
gently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial under the Sixth
Amendment because he understood he was required to appear for all court
proceedings as a condition of his release.107
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides a
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury for all criminal pro-
ceedings.108 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial in
criminal cases that, if tried in federal court, would come within the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee.109 Article II, section 26 of the Montana Constitu-
tion provides a right to a trial by jury but includes that, upon default of
appearance or by consent of the parties, all cases may be tried without a
jury.110
The State argued Salsgiver’s failure to appear for the omnibus hearing
constituted a valid waiver of his right to a jury trial.111 Salsgiver argued that
because a PFMA is a “serious offense” he retained his Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial and asserted the lower courts improperly relied on the
Montana Constitution and cases interpreting its right to a jury provision, to
conclude that an automatic waiver had occurred through a “default of ap-
pearance.”112
To waive the constitutional right to a trial by jury under the Sixth
Amendment, a defendant must waive the right knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily.113 The state bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that such a waiver has been made.114 The Sixth Amendment
requires that a defendant charged with a “serious” crime be afforded the
right to a jury trial unless the right is waived by the defendant.115 An of-
104. Id. at 509.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 511.
108. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
109. Id. at 510.
110. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26.
111. Id. at 511–12.
112. Id. at 512.
113. Id. at 510.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 511 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 327 (1996)).
11
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fense is considered serious when the charges carry a maximum prison sen-
tence of more than six months.116 The PFMA Salsgiver was charged with
carried a maximum sentence of one year.117
Prior to Salsgiver, the Court had not previously addressed the implica-
tions of the Sixth Amendment for serious crimes, having only established
that, for misdemeanor charges, a defendant can waive his right to jury trial
by failing to appear as directed by the trial court.118 Here, the Court found
that Salsgiver’s failure to appear at the omnibus hearing was sufficient to
waive his right to a jury trial under the “default of appearance” provision of
Article II, Section 26 of the Montana Constitution.119 The Court concluded,
however, that the district court erred when it deemed Salsgiver’s failure to
appear at the omnibus hearing constituted a valid waiver of his right to a
jury trial under the United States Constitution.120
The Court held a Sixth Amendment waiver of the right to a jury trial
cannot be presumed solely from a defendant’s knowledge of his release
conditions and his subsequent failure to appear, nor did the record show
Salsgiver knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right.121 In
fact, Salsgiver never represented he wanted to waive his right—he re-
quested a jury trial, and he objected to the bench trial.122 Accordingly, the
Court found that Salsgiver’s Sixth Amendment rights had been violated,
reversed his conviction, and remanded his case to the municipal court for a
jury trial.123
In his dissent, Justice Jim Rice argued Salsgiver knowingly, intelli-
gently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial because he signed
“the Order on Conditions of Release, which, in bold and underlined type-
face, virtually screamed to Salsgiver that he must ‘Personally appear for all
court proceedings. Failure to appear shall result in a waiver of jury
trial.’”124 This, according to Justice Rice, was not an “automatic waiver,”
however, when Salsgiver had the opportunity to explain why he missed the
hearing he “offered no explanation whatsoever for his disobedience of the
court’s orders and for his failure to participate in the process.”125 Justice
Rice concluded by stating he found the totality of the circumstances suffi-
cient to support a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver by Salsgiver,
116. Id.
117. Id. at 512 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–206(3)(a)(1)).
118. Id. at 511.
119. Id. at 512.
120. Id. at 512–13.
121. Id. at 513.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 517 (Rice, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 517–18 (Rice, J., dissenting).
12
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before expressing concern that “the courts should not be held captive to the
whims of voluntarily non-cooperating, non-participating parties.”126
Salsgiver is the first time the Montana Supreme Court has analyzed the
waiver of a jury trial in the context of a serious offense. Montana practition-
ers should be aware the federal analysis for serious offenses—those charges
carrying a sentence of six months of jail time or more— compared to petty
offenses, is now applicable in state court. Further, the failure of a defendant
charged with a serious offense to show up for a hearing, even if he affirma-
tively acknowledged his failure to appear in person waived his right to a
jury trial, does not automatically meet the knowingly, intelligently, and vol-
untarily standard required to waive the right under the Sixth Amendment.
—Kelsey Dayton
V. BAM VENTURES, LLC V. SCHIFFERMAN 127
In BAM Ventures, LLC v. Schifferman, the Montana Supreme Court
took steps to reconcile “seemingly inconsistent statements” made by the
Court in previous cases interpreting Montana Code Annotated
§ 27–19–201, which provides the standards governing the issuance of pre-
liminary injunctions.128 The Court held that all requests for preliminary in-
junctive relief require some demonstration of threatened harm or injury,
before concluding landowners made such a demonstration upon the prima
facie showing of a prescriptive easement.129 While the landowners did not
establish a great or irreparable injury as required under Montana Code An-
notated § 27–19–201(2), the landowners established they would suffer con-
tinuing harm by not being able to access their property by way of the access
route they had used for many years.130 Entering a preliminary injunction
under Montana Code Annotated § 27–19–201(1), which permitted the land-
owners to continue using the access route pending the outcome of the litiga-
tion, fulfilled the purpose of equitable injunctive relief by preserving the
status quo and minimizing the harm to all parties pending a final resolution
on the merits.131
In 2003, Reed and Robin Schifferman (“Schiffermans”) purchased
property in Wise River, Montana.132 At the time of purchase, the Schif-
126. Id. at 519.
127. 437 P.3d 142 (Mont. 2019).
128. Id. at 144–45.
129. Id. at 146–47.
130. Id. at 147.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 143.
13
Staff: <em>Significant Montana Cases</em>
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2020
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-1\MON107.txt unknown Seq: 14 31-MAR-20 9:46
176 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 81
ferman lot lacked physical access.133 In 2004, the Montana Department of
Transportation completed an improvement project for Montana Highway
43, which added a paved section extending from the highway toward the
border of the property and installed a gate nearby.134 The Schiffermans
made use of these improvements and installed additional improvements
over the years, eventually constructing a house on the lot in 2016.135 During
this time, the Schiffermans believed the access was on their lot, and they
received no complaints as to its use.136
In 2017, BAM Ventures, LLC (“BAM”) purchased the lot adjacent to
the Schiffermans.137 BAM, believing the Schiffermans’ driveway ran across
BAM’s property, fenced off the driveway.138 In response, the Schiffermans
removed part of the fencing and began driving across a grassy area to ac-
cess their driveway.139 BAM then filed a quiet title action against the Schif-
fermans to resolve the property ownership of the disputed area.140 The
Schiffermans disputed the boundary allegations and filed a counterclaim for
a prescriptive easement over the access route.141 The Schiffermans also
sought injunctive relief under Montana Code Annotated § 27–19–201(1)
–(3) to bar BAM from restricting access to their lot pending outcome of the
litigation.142
Following a preliminary injunction hearing, the district court granted
the Schiffermans a preliminary injunction pursuant to Montana Code Anno-
tated § 27–19–201(1), holding the Schiffermans had made a prima facie
showing of their claim for prescriptive easement.143 While the district court
agreed with BAM that the Schiffermans had not established they were
likely to suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, the district court
reasoned the Schiffermans did not need to establish such harm because it
was only required for preliminary injunctive relief sought under Montana
Code Annotated § 27–19–201(2).144 Subsequently, BAM appealed.145
District courts enjoy a high degree of discretion to grant or deny pre-
liminary injunctions.146 As such, the Court will not overturn a district
133. Id.
134. Id. at 143–44.
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court’s decision on a preliminary injunction absent a manifest abuse of dis-
cretion.147 Additionally, the Court reviews injunctions based on conclusions
of law for correctness.148 In determining whether to overturn a preliminary
injunction, the Court does not determine the underlying merits of the case,
as such an inquiry is reserved for a trial on the merits.149 In the instant case,
the Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion by enter-
ing the preliminary injunction permitting the Schiffermans to continue to
use the access route pending the outcome of the litigation.150
In support of its holding, the Court began by recognizing the subsec-
tions of Montana Code Annotated § 27–19–201 are written disjunc-
tively.151 As such, the criteria enumerated in only one subsection will suf-
fice to authorize a court to grant equitable, preliminary injunctive relief.152
In other words, “only one subsection need be met for an injunction to is-
sue.”153
The Court then addressed whether Montana Code Annotated
§ 27–19–201, as a whole, contains an injury requirement.154 First, the Court
observed that only subsection (2) specifically addresses “great or irrepara-
ble injury.”155 Under subsection (2), a preliminary injunction may be
granted “when it appears that the commission or continuance of some act
during the litigation would produce a great or irreparable injury to the appli-
cant.”156 Essentially, subsection (2) authorizes relief where it appears that
the commission or continuation of an act during the litigation would pro-
duce an injury so significant it could not be adequately redressed later, even
by means of the litigation.157 Importantly, however, the Court noted that
“the prevention of some degree of harm or injury is an overlapping concept
that is implied within all of the subsections of the statute.”158 The Court
then addressed each additional subsection in turn.159
Under subsection (1), a preliminary injunction may be granted where
“it appears that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded and the relief











156. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–19–201(2) (2019).
157. BAM Ventures, 437 P.3d at 146.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 146–47.
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ance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually.”160
The Court explained that, pursuant to this subsection, injunctive relief is
authorized to stop the continuing illegal act as well as any related harm.161
Under subsection (3), a preliminary injunction may be granted where
“it appears during the litigation that the adverse party is doing or threatens
or is about to do or is procuring or suffering to be done some act in viola-
tion of the applicant’s rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tend-
ing to render the judgment ineffectual.”162 Here, the Court explained in-
junctive relief is authorized to prevent the act as well as the implied harm
that would result from such circumstances.163
Under subsection (4), when “it appears that the adverse party, during
the pendency of the action, threatens or is about to remove or to dispose of
the adverse party’s property with intent to defraud the applicant, an injunc-
tion order may be granted to restrain the removal or disposition.”164 Hence,
the Court reasoned that subsection (4) authorizes relief to prevent the
threatened removal or disposal of the adverse party’s property with intent to
defraud and the obvious harm such actions would cause.165
Finally, under subsection (5), a preliminary injunction may be granted
“when it appears that the applicant has applied for an order under the provi-
sions of 40–4–121 or an order of protection under Title 40, chapter 15.”166
As in the aforementioned sections, without explicitly mentioning “harm” or
“injury,” subsection (5) protects against threatened harm by authorizing re-
lief to protect applicants from economic loss and from physical abuse or
intimidation in domestic and order of protection proceedings.167
The Court concluded by asserting that, while previous Montana cases
have not always used precise language, “collectively they correctly stand
for the principle that all requests for preliminary injunctive relief require
some demonstration of threatened harm or injury, whether under the ‘great
or irreparable injury’ standard of subsection (2), or the lesser degree of
harm implied within the other subsections of § 27–19–201, MCA.”168
Ultimately, while the Court rejected BAM’s argument reading a re-
quirement of irreparable injury into each of the five subsections contained
in Montana Code Annotated § 27–19–201, the Court continues to require a
showing of some degree of harm consistent with the degree of injury im-
160. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–19–201(1).
161. BAM Ventures, 437 P.3d at 146.
162. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–19–201(3).
163. BAM Ventures, 437 P.3d at 146.
164. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–19–201(4)
165. BAM Ventures, 437 P.3d at 146.
166. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–19–201(5).
167. BAM Ventures, 437 P.3d at 146.
168. Id.
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plied under each subsection. Montana practitioners should take note of
BAM Ventures, LLC, including its clarification of the applicable standards
under Montana Code Annotated § 27-19-201 and ensure they demonstrate
the requisite degree of harm when seeking preliminary injunctive relief.
—Lindsay Mullineaux
VI. CITY OF MISSOULA V. METZ 169
In City of Missoula v. Metz, the Montana Supreme Court held that an
officer’s initial contact with a defendant, in response to a 911 call request-
ing a welfare check on the driver of a running but parked vehicle, was a
proper community caretaker stop under Montana law.170 However, the
Court also recognized that the officer lacked the particularized suspicion
necessary at the completion of welfare check to extend the stop to a DUI
investigation.171 Because the officer did not have the requisite particular-
ized suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation at the time he was assured the
driver was not in peril or in need of assistance, the driver was illegally
seized and the driver’s motion to suppress evidence from that point forward
should have been granted.172
On the morning of April 18, 2017, Missoula County deputy county
attorney Selene Koepke (“Koepke”) called 911 to request a welfare check
on the driver of a vehicle parked near Franklin Park in Missoula, Mon-
tana.173 Koepke reported that the vehicle was running, and she could not tell
if the driver was moving or not.174 Koepke informed the 911 operator that
she did not want to get too close to the vehicle but provided the vehicle’s
license plate information.175 Shortly after Koepke’s call, law enforcement
and emergency medical services arrived at the scene.176 The vehicle was
legally parked in a designated parking space.177
Officer Erickson was the first to make contact with the driver, later
identified as Bryan Allan Metz (“Metz”), and Officer Erickson’s body and
dash cameras recorded the interaction.178 As Officer Erickson approached
the vehicle, he observed the vehicle was not running, and Metz sat up and
169. 451 P.3d 530 (Mont. 2019).
170. Id. at 532, 535.
171. Id. at 538.
172. Id. at 539.
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rolled down the window to speak with him.179 Officer Erickson informed
Metz that a caller thought he was sleeping and was concerned about his
safety, but the officer did not personally inquire about Metz’s welfare at this
time.180 Officer Erickson then told Metz to step out of the car to allow
medical personnel to evaluate him.181 As Metz exited the vehicle, three ad-
ditional police officers present at the scene asked Officer Erickson if the
situation was a “210,” meaning an intoxicated driver.182 Officer Erickson
responded “possibly” and asked Metz for his identification.183 After calling
in Metz’s identification to dispatch, Officer Erikson asked Metz a series of
questions, including why he had been at the park and for how long.184 Metz
responded he had been at the park a couple of hours and was trying to take
a nap.185 Officer Erickson did not inquire as to Metz’s welfare until medical
personnel began walking over to see if medical attention was needed.186 At
that point, Officer Erickson asked Metz if he needed any medical atten-
tion.187 Metz responded that he did not require medical attention, and Of-
ficer Erickson sent the medical personnel away.188
Officer Erickson then told Metz to “hang tight” as he stepped away to
discuss the situation with two other officers, including Officer Kamerer.189
Officer Erickson explained the vehicle was not running when he arrived,
but Metz attempted to start the vehicle when he approached.190 Addition-
ally, Officer Erickson told Officer Kamerer Metz had bloodshot eyes and a
little bit of a slur.191 When Officer Erickson asked the other officers if they
saw anything while looking in Metz’s vehicle, Officer Kamerer responded,
“not seeing anything.”192 Officer Kamerer told Officer Erickson that, if
“there is enough, we can process, if not, then we have him walk and come
back and get it later.”193 Officer Erickson responded that he was “not terri-
bly worried,” and he stated, “I don’t really want to pursue it.”194
While Officer Erickson went to take another look in Metz’s car win-
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questioning him.195 Officer Kamerer told Metz he could smell alcohol on
him, and Metz denied drinking before parking his car.196 Upon further
questioning, Metz admitted he was on probation.197 Officers Kamerer and
Erickson then discussed whether Metz would provide a breath test upon the
request of his probation officer.198 However, without speaking to his proba-
tion officer, the officers told Metz he had no choice but to provide a sample,
which Metz refused.199 The officers stepped away once again to discuss the
situation.200 Officer Erickson then stated, “the more I think about it, the
more I think I do have enough to push through with the DUI.”201
After deciding to proceed with the DUI investigation, Officer Erickson
began conducting the field sobriety tests.202 Metz was eventually able to
complete the horizontal gaze nystagmus test but was arrested before any
further field sobriety tests were conducted.203 During the arrest, the officers
questioned Metz about a beer cup found in his car.204 Metz was then placed
in the back of Officer Erickson’s police cruiser, where he again declined to
provide a breath test.205 Multiple reports made at the time of arrest falsely
indicated Metz was passed out in his running vehicle.206 Metz was charged
with misdemeanor DUI and failure to carry proof or exhibit insurance.207
On April 18, 2017, Metz pleaded not guilty to the charges in Missoula
Municipal Court.208 On June 29, 2017, he filed a motion to suppress and
dismiss, alleging that any evidence obtained should be suppressed due to a
lack of particularized suspicion.209 On August 2, 2017, the municipal court
held a hearing on the motion, and Officer Erickson testified and his body
camera footage was entered into evidence.210 Officer Erickson testified that
Metz admitted to drinking alcohol “the night prior, before parking his vehi-
cle to sleep.”211 On cross-examination, Officer Erickson testified that he did

















211. Id. at 534.
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ficers or not.212 Officer Erickson further testified on cross-examination that,
based on his observations of Metz, he did not wish to pursue a DUI investi-
gation after his conversation with Officer Kamerer.213 Following the hear-
ing, the municipal court denied the motion.214 On August 16, 2017, Metz
pleaded nolo contendere to the DUI charge, reserving his right to appeal the
municipal court’s denial of the motion.215 After briefing by the parties, the
district court, functioning as the intermediate appellate court, affirmed the
municipal court’s decision.216 Metz appealed.217
Where district courts function as intermediate appellate courts for ap-
peals from lower courts of record, the Court examines the record indepen-
dently of the district court’s decision.218 Here, the Court examined the mu-
nicipal court’s findings under the clearly erroneous standard219 and deter-
mined the municipal court erred when it determined that particularized
suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation existed at the completion of the
community caretaker stop.220
The Court began its analysis of the common caretaker doctrine by cit-
ing the following test adopted in State v. Lovegren:221
First, as long as there are objective, specific and articulable facts from which
an experienced officer would suspect that a citizen is in need of help or is in
peril, then that officer has the right to stop and investigate. Second, if the
citizen is in need of aid, then the officer may take appropriate action to
render assistance or mitigate the peril. Third, once the officer is assured that
the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in need of assistance or that the peril
has been mitigated, then any actions beyond that constitute a seizure impli-
cating not only the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment, but
more importantly, those greater guarantees afforded under Article II, Sec-
tions 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution as interpreted in this Court’s
decisions.222
The Court then rejected Metz’s argument that Officer Erickson should
have realized Metz was not in danger when he investigated the vehicle and
found neither of the conditions indicated in the 911 call present.223 Having









220. Id. at 539.
221. 51 P.3d 471 (Mont. 2002).
222. Metz, 451 P.3d at 535 (quoting Lovegren, 51 P.3d at 475–76.)
223. Id.
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should have terminated the stop at this time.224 The Court found “such an
interpretation of the community care doctrine too restrictive.”225 Instead,
under the first prong of the Lovegren test, the Court held Officer Erickson
had the right to stop and investigate because the community caretaker role
is “an affirmative duty of police officers.”226 Because Officer Erickson
could not be assured that Metz was not in need of assistance solely based on
the fact that Metz was moving, his initial contact with Metz constituted a
proper community caretaker stop.227
Having determined Officer Erickson’s initial seizure of Metz to con-
duct a welfare check as valid, the Court turned to the question of particular-
ized suspicion for the investigatory stop.228 The Court recognized that,
where an officer makes a valid stop pursuant to the community caretaker
doctrine, events may occur during the stop that give rise to the particular-
ized suspicion necessary for that officer to make a further investigatory stop
pursuant to Montana Code Annotated § 46–5–401.229 However, the Court
also stressed an important limitation on the community caretaker doctrine
set forth in Lovegren:
[once an] officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in
need of assistance or that the peril has been mitigated, then any actions
beyond that constitute a seizure implicating not only the protections pro-
vided by the Fourth Amendment, but more importantly, those greater guar-
antees afforded under Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Consti-
tution as interpreted in this Court’s decisions.230
Moreover, a community caretaker encounter must be terminated once the
officer is assured the citizen is not in peril or in need of assistance.231
First, the Court rejected the municipal court’s finding that the welfare
check lasted well beyond where Officer Erickson told Metz to step out of
the car.232 While the initial contact was valid, “virtually immediately upon
arriving and speaking with Metz, it’s obvious Officer Erickson was assured
that Metz was not in peril or in need of assistance.”233 Additionally, none of
the other officers on the scene approached Metz to see if he needed help.234





228. Id. at 536.
229. Id. at 535.
230. Id. (quoting State v. Lovegren, 51 P.3d 471, 476 (Mont. 2002)).
231. Id. at 536.
232. Id. at 537.
233. Id. at 536.
234. Id.
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whether he was a “210.”235 While Officer Erickson asked Metz to exit the
vehicle so the medical personnel could assess him, no medical personnel
conducted a medical assessment of Metz or even spoke to him.236 Recog-
nizing under the third prong of the Lovegren test that a welfare check must
“actually involve a welfare check,” the Court determined Officer Erickson’s
community caretaker stop was completed before he told Metz to exit his
car.237 At the point Officer Erickson asked Metz to get out of the car, pro-
duce identification, and answer questions, the matter moved beyond a wel-
fare check to a DUI investigation.238
The Court next rejected the State’s argument that Officer Erickson ob-
tained particularized suspicion to perform a DUI-related investigatory stop
prior to the completion of the welfare check.239 At the suppression hearing,
Officer Erickson testified to five indicators giving rise to particularized sus-
picion, including a strong odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, a dazed expres-
sion, a beer cup in the car, and Metz admitting having been drinking.240
However, at the time Officer Erickson’s welfare check was completed, Of-
ficer Erickson had only observed Metz had bloodshot eyes and a dazed
expression.241 While Officer Erickson indicated Metz spoke with a slight
slur at this time, the slur is not evident on the body camera footage.242 The
Court held that these objective factors, in the absence of the additional fac-
tors observed later, failed to support an inference that Metz had committed,
was committing, or was about to commit a crime.243
Additionally, at this time, Officer Erickson stated he did not wish to
pursue a DUI investigation and the other officers on the scene indicated
they saw nothing illegal in the car.244 Based on the limited objective factors
present at the completion of the community caretaker stop and because Of-
ficer Erickson himself did not believe he had particularized suspicion to
conduct a DUI investigation,245 the Court held Officer Erickson did not
have particularized suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation at the time he
was assured Metz was not in peril or in need of assistance.246 Therefore,





239. Id. at 535.
240. Id. at 538.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 537.
243. Id. at 538.
244. Id. at 537.
245. Id. at 539.
246. Id.
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gation.247 Consequently, the Court held the municipal court’s denial of
Metz’s motion to suppress should be reversed, with Metz’s conviction for
misdemeanor DUI vacated and the matter remanded with instructions to
dismiss with prejudice.248
In her dissent, Justice Beth Baker took issue with the Court’s charac-
terization of the municipal court’s holding as “flatly wrong”249 and asserted
that the municipal court clearly understood the difference between the of-
ficer’s welfare inquiries and the ensuing DUI investigatory stop.250 Justice
Baker stressed that the record contained substantial credible evidence to
support the finding that Officer Erickson had an objective, articulable basis
to pursue a DUI investigation at the time the community caretaker stop
concluded.251 Justice Baker further asserted that the majority failed to af-
ford Officer Erickson the “latitude to react and follow up on [his] observa-
tions.”252 Because the brief amount of time Officer Erickson took with
Metz to ask him questions prior to the approach of the medical personnel
was appropriate to ensure that Metz did not require assistance, Justice
Baker went on to note that the community caretaker stop concluded when
Officer Erickson sent away the medical personnel, not when Officer Erick-
son first asked Metz to exit the vehicle.253 At the time Officer Erickson sent
the medical personnel away, he had observed Metz’s dazed expression on
initial contact, a strong odor of alcohol, red and bloodshot eyes, and Metz’s
inability to recall or refusal to explain how long he had been at the park.254
Therefore, Justice Baker concluded the record supported the municipal
court’s finding that Officer Erickson had specific and articulable facts
which, together with rational inferences, reasonably warranted concern that
Metz was under the influence of alcohol and gave rise to particularized
suspicion for further investigation by the time the welfare check con-
cluded.255
The Court responded to Justice Baker’s dissent by noting the munici-
pal court held that Officer Erickson “had become aware of evidence (in-
cluding the Defendant’s own admission) that the driver had consumed alco-
hol” before completion of the welfare check, which was not supported by
the body camera footage.256 While the Court agreed it is within the munici-
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 538 n.3.
250. Id. at 540 (Baker, J., dissenting).
251. Id.




256. Id. at 538 n.3 (majority opinion).
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pal court’s province to assess the credibility and weight of Officer Erick-
son’s testimony, the Court held that nothing in Montana case law requires
the Court to disregard video evidence which contradicts testimony appar-
ently found credible by a lower court.257 The Court acknowledged that,
while it has not yet squarely addressed a situation in which an officer’s
testimony is contradicted by video evidence, other jurisdictions prove in-
structive on the matter,258 and “[w]e cannot blind ourselves to the videotape
evidence simply because an officer’s testimony may, by itself, be read to
support the lower court’s holding.”259
In light of Metz, Montana practitioners should be aware that, where an
investigatory stop stems from a valid stop under the community caretaker
doctrine, particularized suspicion for the investigatory stop must be present
prior to the conclusion of the welfare check. Should an officer lack the
particularized suspicion necessary to extend the welfare check in an investi-
gatory stop at the conclusion of the welfare check, the investigatory stop
will represent a seizure implicating the protections provided by the Fourth
Amendment as well as the protections afforded under Article II, Sections 10
and 11 of the Montana Constitution.
—Lindsay Mullineaux
VII. BUCY V. EDWARD JONES & COMPANY, L.P.260
In Bucy v. Edward Jones & Company, L.P., the Montana Supreme
Court found an employee’s post-termination claims against a federally reg-
istered securities broker mandatorily arbitrable261 where the employee had
voluntarily entered into arbitration agreements in 1998 and 2003.262 The
Court held that the 2003 arbitration agreement was not illusory, uncon-
scionable, lacking in mutuality, or unreasonably one-sided so as to prevent
its enforceability.263 Accordingly, the Court held the employee’s claims
were within the scope of the arbitration agreements and therefore
mandatorily arbitrable pursuant to Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(“FINRA”) regulations.264
In 1996, Adam Bucy (“Bucy”) began working for Edward Jones in St.
Louis.265 In 1998, Bucy applied for National Association of Securities
257. Id. at 539.
258. Id.
259. Id. (quoting Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
260. 445 P.3d 812 (Mont. 2019).
261. Id. at 828.
262. Id. at 818, 824.
263. Id. at 828.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 817.
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Dealers, Inc. (“NASD”) registration as a representative of Edward Jones.266
As part of his application, Bucy submitted a signed NASD Form U4 for
registration in association with Edward Jones.267 In accordance with NASD
regulations in effect at the time, the NASD Form U4 contained a standard
NASD arbitration agreement that provided:
I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between
me and my firm . . . that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitu-
tions, or by-laws of [NASD] as may be amended from time to time and that
any arbitration award rendered against me may be entered as a [judgment] in
any court of competent jurisdiction.268
In 2003, Bucy moved to the new Edward Jones office in Missoula,
Montana.269 At this time, Bucy voluntarily executed a new employment
agreement with Edward Jones to work as a registered investment represen-
tative.270 This 2003 employment agreement contained a similar standard
NASD arbitration clause.271 Further, directly above the signature line, the
agreement stated, “THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS A BINDING ARBI-
TRATION PROVISION WHICH MAY BE ENFORCED BY THE
PARTES.”272
By spring of 2015, Bucy had become “disaffected” by the “culture” at
Edward Jones and “began looking for new employment.”273 Bucy alleged
that while he was negotiating with a competitor firm, LPL Financial, Ed-
ward Jones intercepted his emails or phone calls and learned of his intent to
leave.274 He further asserted that Edward Jones had developed a “corporate
pattern and practice of blackballing ‘breakaway’ brokers” to prevent them
from working with competitors.275
In May 2015, one of Bucy’s clients filed a complaint with FINRA,
alleging Bucy had conducted an unauthorized transaction on the client’s
account.276 This complaint triggered an internal review by Edward Jones as
well as a separate investigation by FINRA.277 As part of its internal review,
Edward Jones contacted several of Bucy’s clients, some of whom later testi-
fied that Edward Jones personnel told them that Bucy had given them bad
266. Id.
267. Id.









277. Id. at 819.
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advice and mishandled their accounts.278 While the Edward Jones internal
review and the FINRA investigation were pending, Bucy finalized negotia-
tions with LPL Financial and executed a contract for prospective employ-
ment.279 Bucy informed Edward Jones of his intent to resign effective July
31, 2015.280
On July 30, 2015, a second client filed a FINRA complaint against
Bucy.281 Following Bucy’s termination, Edward Jones circulated an internal
memo indicating that Bucy had been voluntarily terminated as he had ac-
cepted a job at another firm.282 However, Edward Jones also filed a FINRA
Form U5 stating Bucy was permitted to resign while “under an internal
review that started after the firm received a client complaint alleging unsuit-
able recommendations and discretionary trading.”283 FINRA Form U5 fil-
ings are made publicly available through the FINRA website.284 Three
weeks later, LPL Financial rescinded its employment contract with Bucy.285
Following Bucy’s departure from Edward Jones, his successor con-
tacted a number of Bucy’s past clients.286 Six of these clients eventually
filed FINRA complaints against Bucy alleging that he mishandled their ac-
counts.287 Several of the complainants testified that Edward Jones personnel
encouraged them to file the FINRA complaints.288
On June 27, 2016, Bucy filed suit against Edward Jones, asserting
claims for statutory blacklisting, statutory defamation, and common law tor-
tious interference with prospective business relationships.289 On August 31,
2016, FINRA notified Bucy that it had closed his file without further ac-
tion.290 On September 26, 2016, Edward Jones moved the district court to
dismiss and compel arbitration, asserting that the claims were subject to
arbitration under FINRA regulations.291 Bucy responded, arguing that his
claims were post-termination claims beyond the scope of the arbitration
clauses included in the arbitration agreements.292 Additionally, Bucy argued
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In January 2017, the district court compelled arbitration as to transac-
tions occurring during Bucy’s employment but denied arbitration of the
post-employment claims, pending further discovery.294 In July 2017, fol-
lowing further discovery, Edward Jones renewed its motion to compel arbi-
tration on the post-termination claims.295 The district court denied the mo-
tion on the basis that Edward Jones had failed to develop any additional
facts indicating that the claims were within the scope of the 1998 and 2003
arbitration agreements.296 Edward Jones appealed. Bucy responded in oppo-
sition but did not cross-appeal.297
The Montana Supreme Court reviews district court rulings on motions
to compel arbitration de novo for correctness under the standards of the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)298 or the Montana Uniform Arbitration
Act,299 where applicable.300 Because Edward Jones is a federally registered
securities broker,301 the Court turned its attention to the FAA in support of
its holding.302 The Court stressed that arbitration agreements governed by
the FAA are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” except “upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”303
Consequently, arbitration agreements are subject to all generally applicable
contract defenses, including lack of mutual assent or consideration, fraud,
duress, and unconscionability.304 Essentially:
upon a contested petition or motion to compel arbitration, the court must
consider, as properly placed at issue in a particular case, whether the arbitra-
tion agreement is enforceable under generally applicable principles of con-
tract law and, if so, whether the terms of the agreement require arbitration of
the particular matter or type of matter at issue.305
The Court began its analysis of the arbitration agreements by rejecting
Bucy’s assertion that the 2003 employment agreement lacked mutuality be-
cause it required him to waive ordinary judicial remedies while unfairly
preserving a limited injunctive relief remedy for Edward Jones.306 The
Court explained that Bucy’s argument failed to recognize that the FINRA
regulations authorized either or both parties so seek limited preliminary or




298. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2018).
299. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27–5–101 to 27–5–324 (2019).
300. Bucy, 445 P.3d at 820.
301. Id. at 816–17.
302. Id. at 820.
303. Id. at 821 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 823.
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permanent injunctive relief as an adjunct to arbitration.307 Additionally, the
FAA independently provides that such relief is available to either party.308
Finally, the Court noted Bucy failed to recognize the limited nature of such
a right, which protects only against misappropriation of trade secrets and
other property information pending arbitration.309 Against this backdrop,
the Court explained that Bucy had made no factual or legal showing that the
limited injunctive remedy preserved to Edward Jones in the 2003 employ-
ment agreement rendered the agreement either illusory or oppressive.310 As
such, the Court held that, whether asserted as a condition of unconscionabil-
ity or a stand-alone formation defect, the 2003 arbitration agreement was
not illusory, lacking in mutuality, or unreasonably oppressive.311
The Court then shifted its focus to whether the arbitration agreements
were illegal or void due to a lack of explicit explanation and waiver of
Montana constitutional rights.312 While arbitration agreements must comply
with Montana constitutional standards generally applicable to contracts, the
Court has never required an explicit explanation or waiver of Montana con-
stitutional rights in arbitration agreements.313 Instead, the Court identifies
such explanations, inter alia, as considerations that may be relevant to
whether a valid contract waiver occurred in a particular case.314 Turning to
the case at hand, the Court acknowledged that Bucy correctly pointed out
that neither agreement was the product of arms-length negotiations and that
he had no significant bargaining power in relation to the other party.315
Moreover, neither agreement included an explicit explanation or waiver of
Bucy’s rights under the Montana Constitution.316 However, the Court rec-
ognized that it is beyond dispute Bucy was a highly intelligent, educated
individual when he entered into such agreements and is thus presumed to
have read and understood the meaning of the clear and unambiguous lan-
guage.317 The Court further stressed that the record contained no evidence
that Bucy did not have the ability to consult with counsel prior to executing
either of the agreements or that he entered into either agreement under un-
due economic, social, or practical duress.318 In the end, the Court concluded
the lack of explicit reference to Montana constitutional rights was insignifi-
307. Id.
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cant as Bucy provided no authority or analysis for his implied assertion that
Montana constitutional waiver requirements can override federal securities
regulations.319
In support of its holding, the Court further determined that the arbitra-
tion agreements were not unenforceable in equity as unconscionable.320
While the preprinted, standard forms were unquestionably contracts of ad-
hesion, the Court found neither arbitration agreement unreasonably
favorable to NASD or Edward Jones or unduly oppressive to Bucy.321 Once
again, the Court found Bucy to be a highly intelligent and educated person
who knowingly sought professional licensing and employment as a repre-
sentative of a securities broker in a highly regulated industry.322 The Court
found no evidence demonstrating Bucy was incapable of understanding the
clear and unambiguous language or the pertinent requirements of the then-
governing NASD regulations regarding arbitration.323 Additionally, Bucy
made no showing that the agreements did not conform to the then-gov-
erning NASD regulations.324 As arbitration agreements in accordance with
procedures approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission are not
unconscionable as a matter of law,325 the Court held the subject arbitration
agreements were not unconscionable in equity.326
Finally, the Court held that Bucy’s claims were mandatorily arbitrable
within the express scope of the arbitration agreements.327 Both arbitration
agreements contained arbitration language as required by the applicable
NASD or FINRA regulations in place at the time of execution.328 Essen-
tially, both arbitration agreements required arbitration of any disputes be-
tween or among members or associated persons arising out of or in connec-
tion with the business activities of a member or an associated person.329
The Court reasoned that the predicate factual allegations, implicated legal
duties, and alleged breaches or violations underlying Bucy’s claims all di-
rectly related to the conduct of Edward Jones’ business activities, both
before and after termination of Bucy’s employment. Similarly, Bucy’s
claims directly related to his business activities as an employee of Edward
Jones.330 Thus, the Court held that Bucy’s claims were mandatorily arbitra-
319. Id. at 825.
320. Id. at 827.
321. Id. at 825–26.
322. Id. at 826.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 827.
325. Id. at 826.
326. Id. at 827.
327. Id. at 828.
328. Id. at 827.
329. Id. at 828.
330. Id. at 827–28.
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ble pursuant to the applicable FINRA rules and within the scope of the
arbitration agreements.331 Consequently, the Court reversed the district
court’s judgment denying Edward Jones’ motion to compel Bucy’s post-
termination claims and remanded the matter for entry of an order compel-
ling arbitration of all of Bucy’s claims and dismissing the action.332
Montana practitioners should take note of Bucy, as it demonstrates a
slow shift in the Montana Supreme Court away from hardline disfavor of
arbitration agreements toward general acceptance.333 Currently, arbitration
agreements generally represent valid and enforceable contracts under Mon-
tana law. As seen in Bucy, when faced with a question of arbitration clause
enforceability, the Court will evaluate the arbitration clause using ordinary
state-law rules of contract formation and interpretation and generally appli-
cable contract law defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.
—Lindsay Mullineaux
VIII. IN RE ESTATE OF COTE V. SMITH-COTE 334
In In re Estate of Cote v. Smith-Cote, the Montana Supreme Court held
damages from conversion of stock certificates are compensatory in nature
and can give rise to punitive damages upon a finding of actual malice.335
The Court examined whether the damages from the failure to return wrong-
fully transferred stock were compensatory and constituted an immediate
restoration of monetary value to the appellee.336 The Court concluded that,
because the stock had an immediately ascertainable cash value, its return
functioned as compensatory damages.337 Upon this finding, the Court af-
firmed the award of punitive damages against Farmers State Financial Cor-
poration (“Farmers”), a named defendant, concluding the district court did
not err in determining it acted with actual malice.338 This case gives a com-
prehensive analysis of punitive damages, including when and to what extent
punitive damages are appropriate and reasonable.339
This is the most recent decision stemming from the litigation of the
estate of John Cote Sr. (“John”) by his son John Cote Jr. (“JP”), his sister
331. Id. at 828.
332. Id.
333. Scott J. Burnham, The War against Arbitration in Montana, 66 MONT. L. REV. 139, 156 (2005)
(“In Montana, arbitration is the legal equivalent of the wolf, a critter much despised except by a fringe
group that would spread it widely”).
334. 433 P.3d 221 (Mont. 2019).
335. Id. at 224, 229.
336. Id. at 229.
337. Id. at 228–29.
338. Id. at 232.
339. Id.
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Katherin Clemmence, and the trustees of the Ruth Cote Trust.340 John and
Janice Smith-Cote (“Smith-Cote”) were married in 2009 after John was di-
agnosed with terminal cancer.341 A month before his death, John executed a
will disinheriting JP and Katherin from everything but a broken-down El
Camino and two Navajo blankets, while bequeathing the remainder of his
estate to Smith-Cote, including real property in Ravalli county to which the
Ruth Cote Trust held title.342 Smith-Cote also initiated a stock transfer of
nearly 200 shares of stock in Farmers, which John and JP held as joint
tenants with right of survivorship.343 This wrongful transfer is what gave
rise to the damages discussed herein.344
Shortly before John’s death in late January 2011, Smith-Cote commu-
nicated with Farmers about transferring stock ownership from John and JP
to John only.345 John purportedly signed two separate stock power forms in
late January and early February, respectively, before his death on February
5, 2011.346 Both of these forms were signed after the execution of his Janu-
ary 5, 2011 will, which the Court had previously held he lacked capacity to
execute.347 To effectuate these transfers, Farmers’ policy required a medal-
lion signature guarantee endorsement to guarantee the genuineness and le-
gal capacity of the signatory; however, no medallion guarantee was affixed
to the January form at the time of its execution and the February form was
stamped at an uncertain point in time.348
Edward Jones, the transferring institution, did not witness the execu-
tion of the stock power forms, and, therefore, could not properly guarantee
the signatures provided.349 Farmers never received the January form and
only received the February form after John’s death; however, the February
form was backdated for February 3, 2011, and the stock was subsequently
transferred in full to Smith-Cote.350 When JP sought return of his stock,
Farmers claimed the transfer was effective on February 3, 2011, and it
would return half of the shares of stock in return for a release of liability,
340. Id. at 224–25; see also In re Estate of Cote v. Smith-Cote, No. DA 16-0295, 2017 WL 203681
(Mont. Jan. 17, 2017) (prior related decision finding undue influence in the execution of John Sr.’s will
by his widow, Smith-Cote, and removing her as personal representative of his estate).
341. Smith-Cote, 2017 WL 203681 at *1.
342. Id.
343. In re Estate of Cote, 433 P.3d at 225.
344. Id. at 226.
345. Id. at 225.
346. Id.
347. Smith-Cote, 2017 WL 203681 at *1–2.
348. In re Estate of Cote, 433 P.3d at 225–26.
349. Id. at 225.
350. Id. at 225–26.
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but it refused to return the remaining half, which it had transferred to
Smith-Cote.351
The Court found the backdated February form could not have been
effective before John’s death, and since John and JP held the stock as joint
tenants with right of survivorship, JP was the rightful owner of all of the
shares of Farmers stock.352 The Court also held the wrongful deprivation of
the use and value of stock met the requirements for compensatory dam-
ages.353 Compensatory damages are designed to compensate an injured
party for actual loss, including lost profits if the amount can be determined
with reasonable certainty.354 The lost profits and value of the stock could be
determined with exact certainty and were considered monetary damages,
justified by the fact that securities have an immediate use value similar to
cash.355 The Court found the return of the stock and lost profits from that
stock were meant to compensate JP and make him whole.356
The Court further found Farmers acted with actual malice in its wrong-
ful transfer of the stock and its failure to return the stock in the eight years
preceding this decision.357 Actual malice exists when a defendant has
knowledge of facts or intentionally disregards facts that create a high
probability of injury to the plaintiff and either deliberately acts in conscious
or intentional disregard of that probability or deliberately acts with indiffer-
ence to that probability of injury.358 In awarding punitive damages, the dis-
trict court must demonstrate consideration of factors such as the nature and
reprehensibility of the defendant’s wrongdoing, the extent and intent of de-
fendant’s wrongdoing, the amount of actual damages, and the defendant’s
net worth.359 All of the elements of a claim for punitive damages must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.360
Farmers argued it had merely made a good faith mistake and punitive
damages were not warranted.361 The Court, however, affirmed the district
court’s findings that Farmers had proceeded with actual fraud and/or actual
malice.362 The Court honed in on the fact that Farmers knew the medallion
guarantee had not been affixed until after John’s death, JP had not con-
sented to transferring any of the shares to Smith-Cote, and most egre-
351. Id. at 226.
352. Id. at 231–32.
353. Id. at 227.
354. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–317).
355. Id. at 229.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 231–32 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221).
358. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221(2).
359. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221(7)(b).
360. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221(5).
361. In re Estate of Cote, 433 P.3d at 231.
362. Id.
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giously, that Farmers had not actually transferred the stock until after
John’s death and had backdated the form in order to transfer the stock to
Smith-Cote.363 Beyond that, the Court noted Farmers had disregarded JP’s
rights as a shareholder and ignored its statutory obligation to return the
stock to its rightful owner.364 Farmers’ willful disregard of its own policies,
Montana law, and JP’s rights as a shareholder were sufficient for the district
court to establish punitive damages.365
Farmers also challenged the punitive damages as excessive and viola-
tive of its Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.366 The dis-
trict court awarded punitive damages of $1.1 million, which falls well
within the statutory cap of $10 million or three percent of a defendant’s net
worth, whichever is less.367 The Court noted the punitive damages were
within a reasonable ratio when compared to the amount of compensatory
damages.368 Moreover, despite advice of its own counsel, Farmers pro-
ceeded with deliberate indifference in violating both its own policies and
Montana law, warranting punitive damages that were not excessive when
compared to other analogous cases.369
Justice McKinnon dissented, joined by Justices Baker and Rice, dis-
agreeing with the majority’s definition of compensatory damages.370 Justice
McKinnon did not agree with the majority’s view that the stock shared the
same immediate cash value as money, and, thus, the stock did not satisfy
the statutory requirements for an award of punitive damages.371 In her dis-
senting opinion, Justice McKinnon asserted the stocks themselves are
unique and do not have the same monetary value required by statute, and
payments or distributions on the stock may or may not be considered com-
pensatory.372 She further considered the interest on the wrongfully held
property to be the only true compensatory damages awarded in this case.373
Accordingly, because the interest award was negligible compared to the full
value, she would have found the award of punitive damages to be excessive
when combined with the district court’s justifications for the award.374
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 231–32.
366. Id. at 232; see also BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (holding that a grossly
excessive award of punitive damages may violate a party’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
367. In re Estate of Cote, 433 P.3d at 233 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–220(3)).
368. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–220(3)).
369. Id.
370. Id. at 234 (McKinnon, Baker, & Rice, JJ., dissenting).
371. Id.
372. Id. at 236.
373. Id. at 238.
374. Id. at 243–44 (noting that, of the nine statutory factors for determining punitive damages, the
district court focused on only three in its determination).
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Regardless of the dissenting opinion in this case, the majority recog-
nized an award of punitive damages can be sustained when the damages
awarded in a case are non-monetary, so long as the damages are based on
something fungible, transferrable, and that has a redeemable, immediately
liquid ascertainable cash value like the stock at issue here.375 Montana prac-
titioners should take note of the Court’s discussion of compensatory dam-
ages and its analysis of the current scope of punitive damages under Mon-
tana law.
—Remy Orrantia
IX. HOWARD V. REPLOGLE 376
In Howard v. Replogle, the Montana Supreme Court determined
whether a physician’s failure to disclose his financial interest in a surgical
products company prevented his patient from being able to give informed
consent in a medical malpractice case.377 The appeal arose from the district
court’s denial of both a motion for judgment as a matter of law and a mo-
tion for a new trial after a jury verdict for the defendant.378 The Court ulti-
mately held the question presented was one properly before the jury and no
substantial evidence existed to warrant a new trial.379
Around the year 2000, Kathy Howard (“Howard”) was injured in a car
accident as well as a slip and fall down a set of stairs, resulting in chronic
back pain.380 In 2008, Howard was referred to Dr. Replogle, who per-
formed a decompression procedure with minimal success.381 Dr. Replogle
then suggested and performed a multi-level fusion on Howard’s spine in
2009.382 This procedure unfortunately did not solve all of Howard’s back
pain, and, in early 2010, Dr. Replogle further suggested a minimally inva-
sive fusion of her L5-S1 vertebrae using an OptiMesh graft.383 This proce-
dure as well failed to solve Howard’s chronic pain, and in 2012, another
doctor performed a revision surgery on her spine and discovered problems
with the OptiMesh used in Dr. Replogle’s procedure.384
375. Id. at 228–29 (majority opinion).
376. 450 P.3d 866 (Mont. 2019).
377. Id. at 869.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 871.
380. Id. at 867.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 867–68.
384. Id. at 868.
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OptiMesh is a medical device designed, manufactured, and marketed
by Spineology, Inc. (“Spineology”).385 OptiMesh is used in interbody fu-
sions, like the one Dr. Replogle performed on Howard, as a containment
device, which is inserted into the disc space and filled with bone graft mate-
rial.386 “Off-label” OptiMesh had been used in interbody fusions in the
United States and Europe since 2003, but it is not regulated by the FDA.387
Significantly, Dr. Replogle had first used OptiMesh in 2007, and he later
purchased $110,000 worth of Spineology stock and entered into a consult-
ing agreement with Spineology.388
Howard filed claims against Dr. Replogle alleging negligence and
breach of the standard of care owed to a patient, specifically asserting Dr.
Replogle’s failure to disclose his financial interest in Spineology constituted
a failure to obtain her informed consent for the procedure.389 Howard ini-
tially presented the informed consent issue as a question of fact for the jury,
asking that it find she had not given informed consent.390 Howard’s appeal
instead asked the Court to determine the issue of informed consent as a
matter of law.391 The Court, however, noted the issue of informed consent
should properly be presented to the jury to determine whether the plaintiff
could establish: (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) that the defendant
had departed from the standard of care; and (3) the departure had cause the
plaintiff’s injuries.392
At trial, both parties presented expert opinions on whether a financial
interest must be disclosed.393 Notwithstanding Howard’s testimony, the jury
found she had given her informed consent to the procedure and Dr. Replo-
gle had acted within the applicable standard of care.394 Further, because
there was no substantial evidence to the contrary, and because Howard was
able to fully present her case that she did not give informed consent to the
jury, the Court refused to disturb the verdict.395 The denials of both How-
ard’s motion for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law were af-
firmed.396
Howard v. Replogle affirms a jury verdict that a physician’s failure to







391. Id. at 869.
392. Id. at 870 (citing Estate of Wilson v. Addison, 258 P.3d 410, 414 (Mont. 2011)).
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affect a patient’s ability to give informed consent. This decision indicates
that medical practitioners throughout the state do not need to disclose their
financial interests in order to gain valid informed consent for medical pro-
cedures and serves as an example of how the Court will review the appeal
of a jury verdict on the issue in the future.
—Remy Orrantia
X. UNITED STATES SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY V.
ESTATE OF WARD 397
In United States Specialty Insurance Company v. Estate of Ward, the
Montana Supreme Court answered the certified question of whether the
passenger of an aircraft crash can stack the limits of three separate aircraft
liability policies issued to the pilot.398 The Court found the plain language
of the insurance contract limited its application to each occurrence and each
plane insured, preventing the policy from being stacked.399
Darrell Ward was a passenger in a plane piloted by Mark Melotz
(“Melotz”) before it crashed, killing them both.400 Melotz carried separate
liability policies for each of his three planes, which included coverage for
bodily injury to each passenger for each occurrence involving the plane
insured under each policy.401 Following the crash, U.S. Specialty Insurance
Company (“USSIC”) paid the Estate of Darrell L. Ward (the “Estate”) its
single passenger maximum of $100,000, but the Estate argued it was enti-
tled to stack Melotz’s insurance policies and receive the maximum amount
under all three policies.402 USSIC filed a declaratory judgment action in the
United States District Court for the District of Montana, which then certi-
fied this question to the Montana Supreme Court.403
The Court applied the general rules of contract law to interpret US-
SIC’s insurance contracts.404 The plain meaning of a contract applies unless
its language is ambiguous.405 The Court held the plain language of USSIC’s
policy, as understood from the viewpoint of a consumer with average intel-
ligence, limited the coverage to both the specific aircraft involved and each
individual occurrence that resulted in bodily injury.406 Consequently, the
397. 444 P.3d 381 (Mont. 2019).
398. Id. at 382.
399. Id. at 388.
400. Id. at 382.
401. Id. at 382–83.
402. Id. at 383.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. (quoting Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 305 P.3d 861, 865 (Mont. 2013)).
406. Id. at 383–84.
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Court found the policy to be unambiguous, but noted an unambiguous in-
surance contract may still be unenforceable if it violates public policy.407
Here, the Estate contended public policy required the stacking of third-party
liability insurance.408
In Montana, public policy is prescribed by the legislature through its
enactment of statutes, and insurance policies that violate statutory provi-
sions are contrary to public policy and thus unenforceable.409 The Estate
likened aviation insurance to motor vehicle insurance, which must be
stacked in certain instances, but the Court recognized the statutory defini-
tion of a motor vehicle is limited to vehicles meant for travel on high-
ways.410 Lacking any persuasive public policy, the Court rejected this argu-
ment as well.411
The Estate also argued that, under the reasonable expectation doctrine,
the three premiums could be stacked to provide further coverage to any of
Melotz’s passengers.412 The reasonable expectation doctrine depends on
both the reasonable expectations of the claimant as well as his status under
the insurance policy.413 The Estate argued the aircraft liability policy is per-
sonal and portable to Melotz, thereby allowing the stacking of passenger
coverages under his policies.414 The Court disagreed with this, falling back
on the plain, unambiguous language of the contract itself, which limited the
coverage to the involved aircraft.415
On this point, Justice McKinnon specially concurred to further distin-
guish the differences between first-party motor vehicle coverages and third-
party aviation insurance.416 Her concurrence highlights the fact that the
Court has never stacked third-party liability coverage because it is funda-
mentally not personal and portable to the claimant.417 Indeed, insurance
coverage is not illusory if a third-party cannot stack liability insurance be-
cause that third party should have no reasonable expectation of stacking
liability coverage on vehicles not involved in the accident.418 Further, al-
though an insurer may not prohibit stacking when doing so would defeat
coverage for which an insurer paid valuable consideration, the Estate was
407. Id. at 384.
408. Id.
409. Id. (quoting Hardy v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 67 P.3d 892, 898 (Mont. 2003)).
410. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 33–23–204(1)(a)).
411. Id. at 384–85.
412. Id. at 385.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 387.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 388 (McKinnon, J. concurring).
417. Id.
418. Id. at 389.
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not the named insurer under the policy and was not entitled to stack liability
coverages as a third-party claimant.419
United States Specialty Insurance Company, in combination with
Cross v. Warren, provides definitive answers to how the Court approaches
insurance stacking cases. For a policy to be stackable, the coverage must be
personal to the claimant and reasonably expected to cover the accident. Be-
cause of this, stacking is generally not applicable in the context of third-
party liability policies. Ultimately, the plain language of an insurance con-
tract will govern unless contravening circumstances prevent its enforce-
ment. Montana practitioners should take care to understand the current ana-
lytical framework governing the stacking of insurance policies in Montana,
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